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The	choice	Britain	faces	if	it	wants	an	EU	trade	deal:
either	EFTA,	or	the	Ukraine	model
Britain	faces	a	fateful	decision.	If	it	wants	an	FTA	with	the	EU,	says	Carl	Baudenbacher	(Monckton
Chambers/LSE),	it	will	need	to	either	sign	up	to	EFTA/EEA	institutions,	or	accept	the	Ukraine	model	–	which	will
mean	it	is	still	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ECJ.
Under	Trajan	the	Roman	Empire,	at	its	greatest	extent,	encompassed	the	entire	Mediterranean	region,	but	also
parts	of	present-day	Germany,	Britain,	Romania,	Turkey,	Syria	and	Armenia.	The	European	Union	is	preparing	to
build	a	similar	empire.	Roman	law	played	an	important	role	in	the	expansion	of	the	Roman	Empire;	and	the	EU
relies	on	the	export	of	its	law,	and	the	extraterritorial	effect	of	the	case	law	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ).
The	judges’	meeting	room	at	the	European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ).	Photo:	muora	via	a	CC-
BY-NC-SA	2.0	licence
The	EU	has	concluded	bilateral	association	treaties	with	four	former	Soviet	republics,	Ukraine,	Georgia,	Moldova
and	Armenia,	under	which	these	countries	are	aligning	their	legislation	in	important	fields	with	EU	law.	The	ECJ	has
a	monopoly	in	the	interpretation	of	treaty	law	which	is	identical	in	substance	to	EU	law.	Since	each	side	can	bring	a
dispute	before	the	ECJ	unilaterally,	the	European	Commission	may	take	a	case	to	its	own	court	and	thus	has	a	de
facto	right	of	surveillance	over	the	associated	states.	Pro	forma,	the	proceedings	before	the	ECJ	are	preceded	by
an	arbitration	mechanism,	which	must,	however,	request	the	ECJ	for	a	binding	ruling	in	all	significant	cases.	As
leading	commentators	from	the	UK,	Belgium,	Norway	and	Germany	have	emphasised,	this	is	a	sham	arbitration
court.	The	aim	of	the	above-mentioned	treaties	is	to	bring	the	four	states	closer	to	the	ideas	of	democracy,	the	rule
of	law	and	market	economy.
The	same	system	is	now	to	be	set	up	for	Morocco,	Algeria,	Tunisia,	Libya,	Egypt,	Jordan,	Lebanon,	Israel,
Palestine	and	Syria.	For	obvious	reasons,	Turkey	does	not	figure	on	this	list.	It	is	officially	still	a	candidate	for	EU
membership.	The	EU	also	wants	Switzerland	and	the	UK	to	accept	the	Ukraine	model.	However,	these	two	states
need	no	EU	tutoring	on	democracy,	the	rule	of	law	and	market	economy.
It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	EU’s	expansion	in	the	form	described	above	is	a	wise	policy.	In	the	face	of	major
internal	problems,	it	looks	like	a	diversionary	tactic.	But	that	is	not	the	subject	of	the	considerations	below.	Nor	can
the	EU	be	morally	reproached.	It	is,	generally	speaking,	a	benign	hegemon	compared	with	what	former	European
powers	have	to	answer	for.
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If	you	ask	how	Britain	ended	up	with	the	Ukraine	model,	you	have	to	look	to	Switzerland.	Switzerland	has
concluded	some	120	bilateral	agreements	with	the	EU.	Twenty	of	these	are	particularly	important.	From	2008	on,
the	EU	claimed	that	these	treaties	needed	to	be	subject	to	a	supranational	supervisory	and	judicial	mechanism.	At
the	same	time,	the	EU	refused	to	conclude	further	bilateral	treaties	without	an	institutional	structure.	In	2013,	the
Union	proposed	to	Switzerland	that	it	dock	with	the	institutions	of	the	European	Free	Trade	Association	(EFTA)
pillar	of	the	European	Economic	Area	(EEA),	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	and	the	EFTA	Court.	However,	the
Swiss	government	declined	this	offer	and	instead	indicated	that	it	wished	to	make	the	bilateral	agreements	subject
to	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ECJ.
The	Swiss	government	did	not	admit	it,	but	behind	this	move	was	the	desire	to	set	a	point	of	no	return	on	the	road
to	Swiss	accession	to	the	EU.	When	it	became	clear	in	the	course	of	the	negotiations	that	the	ECJ	model	would	not
stand	a	chance	in	a	referendum	in	Switzerland,	the	EU	put	the	Ukraine	model	on	the	table.	Following	the	approval
of	the	Swiss	Federal	Council	in	the	spring	of	2018,	the	Ukraine	mechanism	was	also	presented	to	the	British.
Surprisingly,	Theresa	May’s	government	accepted	it	and	when	Boris	Johnson	became	Prime	Minister,	he	too
initially	agreed.	Now,	however,	resistance	is	stirring.
On	the	other	hand,	the	government	of	Switzerland,	a	world	champion	in	innovation	which	regularly	tops	global
competitiveness	rankings,	is	trying	to	sell	the	Ukraine	model	to	its	people.	The	Ukraine	mechanism	is	the	core	of
the	planned	Institutional	Agreement	with	the	EU	(“InstA”).	However,	the	efforts	to	present	InstA	as	a	Swiss
negotiating	success	are	embarrassing.	Nothing	of	note	has	been	“wrested”	from	the	EU,	nor	is	it	true	that
Switzerland	negotiated	a	better	deal	than	the	UK.	It	is	clear	to	anyone	with	practical	experience	of	the	ECJ	that	the
dispute	settlement	clauses	in	all	bilateral	treaties,	whether	with	post-Soviet	states,	the	countries	of	the	southern
Mediterranean	or	Switzerland	and	the	UK,	would	be	interpreted	uniformly.
However,	even	if	textual	differences	were	to	play	a	role	and	the	InstA	were	to	be	interpreted	solely	on	its	text,	the
circumstances	would	have	to	be	taken	into	account.	They	would	clearly	argue	for	a	situation	analogous	to	that	in
the	case	of	Ukraine.	It	would,	in	any	event,	be	the	ECJ	that	would	decide.	The	latter	has	already	interpreted	the	free
trade	agreements	(FTAs)	concluded	with	the	then	EFTA	states	in	1972	uniformly.	This	was	despite	the	ECJ	not
having	a	monopoly	on	interpretation	under	these	FTAs.
There	is	no	point	in	the	semantic	gymnastics	of	talking	about	a	“two-pillar	system”	where	there	is	only	one	pillar	–
namely	the	EU	–	or	about	“self-monitoring	by	Switzerland”	where	the	monitoring	competence	is	actually	with	the
European	Commission.	Even	the	efforts	to	present	the	fake	arbitration	panel	as	a	body	with	considerable	powers
are	devoid	of	reality.	It	is	notable	that	the	EU’s	Brexit	negotiator	Michel	Barnier	only	speaks	of	the	ECJ.
Swiss	InstA	aficionados	console	themselves	with	the	assertion	that	the	ECJ	is	a	respected	court	with	a	great	track
record.	Of	course,	that	is	undisputed.	However,	it	is	besides	the	point.	The	ECJ	is,	after	all,	the	court	of	the	other
party,	and	thus	it	lacks	impartiality.	As	an	institution	of	the	EU,	the	ECJ	has	the	DNA	of	the	EU,	just	as	the	Federal
Supreme	Court	has	the	DNA	of	Switzerland.	Anyone	who	is	not	impartial	is	biased.	That	is	not	a	lack	of	character,
but	an	objective	fact	and	it	also	applies	to	the	future	UK-EU	relationship.
It	is	precisely	the	EU’s	plan	to	create	a	new	empire	around	the	Mediterranean	that	should	divert	Berne’s	foreign
policy	from	its	rigid	rabbit’s-eye	view	of	the	(alleged)	Brussels	snake.	After	all,	there	is	room	in	Europe	for	two
structures.	Not	all	states	are	interested	in	political	integration	and	not	all	believe	in	centralism.	The	core	of	the
second	structure	could	be	EFTA.	The	EU	would	concentrate	on	political	integration,	while	the	second	structure
would	limit	itself	to	economic	integration.	Both	organisations	would	work	closely	together,	and	the	law	would	be
basically	the	same	in	substance	in	both.	However,	surveillance	and	judicial	control	would	be	separate,	as	in	the
EEA.	This	would	leave	some	room	for	systemic	competition.	Switzerland	and	the	UK	would	be	potential	members	of
the	second	structure,	in	addition	to	the	current	EEA/EFTA	states	Iceland,	Liechtenstein	and	Norway.	However,	the
fact	that	Israel,	for	instance,	is	on	the	list	of	EU	candidates	for	an	agreement	with	the	Ukraine	mechanism	also
makes	one	sit	up	and	take	notice.	How	would	a	Joe	Biden	administration	(or	a	second	Trump	administration)	in	the
US	view	this?	Finally,	it	is	worth	recalling	that	Bill	Clinton’s	secretary	of	state
Madeleine	Albright	recommended	EEA/EFTA	membership	for	Turkey
more	than	two	decades	ago.
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In	the	second	half	of	the	19th	and	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century,	agreements	granting	extraterritorial	jurisdiction	to
the	courts	of	the	other	party	were	known	as	“unequal	treaties”.	There	was	talk	of	“colonisation	without	colonies”.
The	cases	in	point	were	mainly	China,	Japan	and	the	Ottoman	Empire.	The	Swiss	Federal	Council	must	have	the
courage	to	tell	its	people	that	Switzerland	wants	the	InstA,	with	its	subordination	to	the	supervisory	competence	of
the	European	Commission	and	the	jurisdictional	sovereignty	of	the	ECJ,	as	a	step	on	the	road	to	Switzerland’s
future	accession	to	the	EU.	If	this	is	not	feasible,	the	Swiss	Federal	Council	must	break	away	from	InstA	and	join
forces	with	other	free	trade-	and	market-oriented	non-EU	countries.
The	UK	is	also	facing	a	fateful	decision.	If	it	wants	a	FTA	with	the	EU	worthy	of	the	name,	the	EU	will	insist	on
either	the	Ukraine	model	or	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	and	the	EFTA	Court.	A	deal	based	on	the	Ukraine
mechanism	would	be	a	bad	deal.	Instead	of	agreeing	to	that,	the	UK	should	follow	David	Owen’s	advice	and	move
closer	to	the	EEA	in	a	second	round	of	negotiations.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	LSE.
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